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Abstract
Studies have shown that top leaders and department heads 
of privately-owned enterprises differ significantly in the 
types of corruption crimes and the links where crimes 
are committed. Therefore, corruption crimes of private 
entrepreneurs should be countered with the methods well 
targeted at the subjects of crime. In addition, penalties do 
not fit crimes by the conviction and penalty imposition for 
corruption crimes, which seriously undermine the effect 
of criminal penalties on crime prevention. Therefore, the 
sentencing range should be elaborated and other measures 
should be taken so that crimes and penalties will be balanced. 
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INTRODUCTION
Since the reform and opening up, more and more persons 
have become private entrepreneurs. By bringing their labor 
and wisdom into play, they have created wealth, expanded 
the market, developed the economy, and boosted the 
reform. However, in recent years, private entrepreneurs 
increasingly tend to commit crimes, which not only affects 
the healthy development of enterprises but also causes 
serious damage to the market economic environment. 
In particular, private entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes 
have attracted more attention in recent years as a result 
of many “collusions between officials and businessmen”. 
Most existing studies of private entrepreneurs’ corruption 
crimes focus on theoretical speculation, and there are 
few empirical studies. It should be noted that both 
theoretical research and empirical research are essential 
methods for scientific research. But in terms of the study 
of crimes, empirical research is more suitable and plays 
an irreplaceable role (Zhao, 2000). U.S. criminologist 
Richard Qinney even believes that “In a sense, the modern 
criminology is empirical in basic methodology elaboration 
(Research Office for the Law on Reform through Labor, 
1985, p.25). Therefore, the study of private entrepreneurs’ 
corruption crimes should not be just limited to theoretical 
analysis, and the empirical study should be enhanced. 
As the study of private entrepreneurs’ corruption 
crimes is at its initial stage, there are some topics 
remaining untouched: How is the criminal situation, 
what countermeasures should be taken, whether penalties 
fit crimes, etc. The solutions to these problems need 
to be based on empirical data. Therefore, 268 cases of 
private entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes are selected 
from the “Database of Judgment Documents on 
Entrepreneurs’ Crimes” of the Research Center for Chinese 
Entrepreneurs’ Crimes at Beijing Normal University 
to conduct a preliminary empirical study of private 
entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes in three aspects: hazards, 
countermeasures and sentencing. 
1. AWARENESS OF THE SERIOUSNESS 
AND HARMFULNESS OF CRIMES 
1.1 Description of Status Quo
According to the conventional  opinion,  private 
entrepreneurs are main criminals with offering bribes and 
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other1 “output corruption crimes”, and it is common to 
“find entrepreneurs behind corrupt officials”. A deputy to 
the People’s Congress of Shanxi Province said, “Behind 
almost every corrupt officials stands enterprises’ bosses”2. 
According to the statistics, misappropriation by virtue of 
position and other “input corruption crimes” also account 
for a high proportion of private entrepreneurs’ corruption 
crimes, and they far outnumber “output corruption 
crimes”. As shown in Table 1, among the 268 criminal 
judgments of private entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes 
already published in 2014, “input corruption crimes” 
account for 69%, while “output corruption crimes” 
1 Private entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes include the crime of 
offering bribes, the crime of entities’ offering bribes, the crime of 
offering bribes to entities, the crimes of offering bribes to non-
government employees, the crime of non-government employees’ 
accepting bribes, the crime of misappropriation by virtue of position, 
and the crime of embezzlement. By the interest transfer direction, 
corruption practices are divided into three types: the first type is 
“output corruption crime”, including the crime of offering bribes, 
the crime of entities’ offering bribes, the crime of offering bribes 
to entities and the crimes of offering bribes to non-government 
employees; the second type is “input corruption crime”, including 
the crime of non-government employees’ accepting bribes and 
the crime of misappropriation by virtue of position; and the third 
type is “embezzlement corruption crime” means the crime of 
embezzlement. The first two types have obvious criminal features 
and will be studied intensively in this thesis. 
2 People’s Daily Online. Retrieved 2015, June 16 from http://leaders.
people.com.CN/n/2015/0130/c58278-26477683.html 
account for only 12.7%. These two types of crimes differ 
greatly in crime amounts: The average crime amount 
of the 33 “output corruption crimes” with exact crime 
amounts was RMB 331,465.33 yuan, while the average 
crime amount of the 146 “input corruption crimes” with 
exact crime amounts” was as high as RMB 2,485,942.71 
yuan. According to the Criminal Law and the relevant 
judicial interpretations, the crime amounts of both these 
two types of crimes have reached the criteria for heavier 
penalties for “huge amounts”. To a certain extent, this 
reflects the huge harm of these two types of crimes to 
society. 
Table 1
Distribution of Private Entrepreneurs’ Corruption Crimes 
Effective 
Crime of offering bribes 18 2.0 6.7 6.7 
Crime of entities’ offering bribes 13 1.4 4.9 11.6 
Crime of offering bribes to non-government employees 3 .3 1.1 12.7 
Crime of non-government employees’ accepting bribes 59 6.4 22.0 34.7 
Crime of misappropriation by virtue of position 126 13.7 47.0 81.7 
Crime of embezzlement 49 5.3 18.3 100.0 
Total 268 29.1 100.0 
Missing Other crimes 654 70.9 
Total 922 100.0 
1.2 Problem Study
The above data not only reflect private entrepreneurs’ 
serious corruption crime situation, but also shown the 
high dark figure of such crimes (because according 
to the traditional perspective, only “output corruption 
crime” is deemed as corruption crime). Of course, the 
inadequate awareness of private entrepreneurs’ corruption 
is embodied not just this aspect. 
First  of all ,  from the traditional perspective, 
“corruption” is usually associated with politicians and 
public officials (Stapenhurst & Kpundeh, 2001), and 
there is a mindset that corruption corresponds to public 
officials (Zhang, 2014). Therefore, some scholars 
do not recognize private entrepreneurs’ “corruption 
crime” when this concept was just put forward. But 
actually, provisions on the corruption in the private 
sector were made in the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (“the Convention”) passed at the 
United Nations General Assembly in 2003.3 The Chinese 
3 Article 21 of the Convention: Each State Party shall consider 
adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary 
to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally 
in the course of economic, financial or commercial activities: (a) 
The promise, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of an undue 
advantage to any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a 
private sector entity, for the person himself or herself or for another 
person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act 
or refrain from acting; (b) the solicitation or acceptance, directly 
or indirectly, of an undue advantage by any person who directs or 
works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person 
himself or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in 
breach of his or her duties, act or refrain from acting. Article 22 
of the Convention: Each State Party shall consider adopting such 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as 
a criminal offence, when committed intentionally in the course of 
economic, financial or commercial activities, embezzlement by a 
person who directs or works, in any capacity, in a private sector 
entity of any property, private funds or securities or any other thing 
of value entrusted to him or her by virtue of his or her position. 
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government signed the Convention. As a carrier of 
the latest concept of global anti-corruption and the 
latest experience in cooperation mechanism, so far the 
Convention is the most complete and most extensive 
international legal document on corruption crime (Zhu, 
2005). Therefore, the objective existence of private 
entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes is recognized in the 
international community. 
Secondly, the public still generally thinks that the 
harms of private entrepreneurs are limited to food safety 
and environmental pollution. These harms affect our 
life quality or threaten our safety, and more importance 
should be attached to them. But we should not ignore 
this universal phenomenon: The long-standing food 
safety crimes and environmental pollution crimes are 
inseparable from widespread corruption and collusion 
between government officials and businessmen. The 
reason for some officials’ “sacrificing national or public 
interests” despite huge economic losses caused to the 
state is the interest transfer from private entrepreneurs. 
Such interest transfer is accompanied by “output 
corruption crimes”. Therefore, “output corruption 
crimes” not only undermines the government’s image 
and deteriorate the economic environment, but also 
directly damage the public interests. Serious harm to 
“output corruption crimes” should not be overlooked. As 
elites in society, private entrepreneurs’ misappropriation 
by virtue of position, accepting bribes and other 
misconducts not only undermine the authoritativeness 
and stability of laws and the legitimate rights and 
interests of companies, but also undermine honesty, 
credibility, fairness and other core values maintaining 
social existence and development foundation (Zhang, 
2014). Such “negative energy” is undoubtedly running 
counter to “better playing entrepreneurs’ role” advocated 
at the Third Plenary Session of the eighteenth CPC 
Central Committee.
At last, private entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes 
have not been properly dealt with and attracted adequate 
attention. In the important speech delivered by Xi Jinping 
at the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteen CPC Central 
Discipline Inspection Commission, Xi (2015) said, “We 
must continue to intensively fight against corruption and 
take a ‘zero toleration’ attitude towards corruption”. In 
this situation, public officials’ corruption crimes have 
been curbed to some extent, but in sharp contrast, private 
entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes remain untackled in the 
national “anti-corruption system”. In fact, anti-corruption 
measures only targeting by public officials can curb 
corruption crimes just to a certain extent because private 
entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes are accompanied by 
public officials’ corruption crimes. Therefore, an all-round 
anti-corruption concept should be established to include 
private entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes in the overall 
strategy for fighting against corruption. Only in this way, 
will the weaknesses in the fight against corruption could 
be overcome to comprehensively and concertedly boost 
the continuous and in-depth implementation of the fight 
against corruption. 
2 .  C R I M E  P R E V E N T I O N : 
COUNTERMEASURES NOT TARGETED 
ENOUGH
2.1 Description of Status Quo
2.1.1 Analysis of the Interaction Between “Titles in 
Enterprises” and “Types of Crimes”
According to the conventional opinion, the powers of 
private entrepreneurs as “top leaders” are not restrained 
or supervised, and they tend to be used to commit 
crimes. Are there differences in the types of crimes 
committed by “top leaders” and “non-top leaders” of 
enterprises? The author analyzes the interaction between 
“specific crimes” and “titles in enterprises” (the results 
are shown in Table 2). As can be seen from the Chi-
square test results X2=45.401, df=35, p=0.112, persons 
holding different titles in enterprises do not differ 
greatly in specific crimes committed. But the data in 
Table 2 show that actual controllers, and chairmen of the 
Boards of Directors and other “top leaders” differ from 
department heads to some extent in the specific crimes 
committed. Specifically, over half of chairmen of Board 
of Directors, general managers, legal representatives and 
other top leaders commit the crime of offering bribes, 
the crime of entities’ offering bribes and the crime of 
offering bribes to non-government employees, while 
over half of department heads commit the crime of non-
government employees’ accepting bribes, the crime of 
misappropriation by virtue of position and the crime of 
embezzlement. In order to find whether “top leaders” 
and “department heads” differ significantly in the types 
of crimes committed, the author integrates relevant 
indicators and 4 makes the interaction analysis again. 
The chi-square test results, X2=19.139, df=8, p=0.014 
show that “top leaders” and “department heads” differ 
greatly in the types of crimes committed: in privately-
owned enterprises, “top leaders” mostly commit “output 
corruption crimes” and department heads usually commit 
“input corruption crimes”. 
4 Specifically, “chairmen of the Boards of Directors”, “general 
managers”, “actual controllers” and other indicators are collectively 
deemed as “top leaders”; “other department heads”, “chief financial 
officials” and other indicators are collectively deemed as “department 
heads”, “crime of offering bribes”, “crime of entities’ offering 
bribes” and “crime of non-government employees’ offering bribes” 
are collectively deemed as “output corruption crimes”, and “crime 
of non-government employees’ accepting bribes” and “crime of 
misappropriation by virtue of position” are collectively deemed as 
“input corruption crimes”. 
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Table 2
Analysis of the Interaction Between Titles and Crimes of Private Entrepreneurs (N=268)
Titles in enterprises
TotalActual 
controllers, 
shareholders
Other 
department 
heads
Supervisors
Persons in 
charge of 
technology
Chairmen of the 
boards of directors, 
general managers, 
legal representatives
Directors
Persons in 
charge of the 
relationship 
between the 
Party and the 
masses
Persons in 
charge of 
finance
Specific 
crime 
Crime of offering 
bribes 16.7% 27.8% 5.6% 50.0% 100.0% 
Crime of entities’ 
offering bribes 7.7% 23.1% 69.2% 100.0% 
Crime of offering 
bribes to non-
government 
employees 
100.0% 100.0% 
Crime of non-
government 
employees’ 
accepting bribes 
5.1% 52.5% 1.7% 6.8% 32.2% 1.7% 100.0% 
Crime of 
misappropriation 
by virtue of 
position 
2.4% 50.8% 0.8% 0.8% 31.0% 2.4% 0.8% 11.1% 100.0% 
Crime of 
embezzlement 2.0% 49.0% 40.8% 2.0% 6.1% 100.0% 
Total 4.1% 47.4% 0.7% 2.2% 36.9% 1.5% 0.4% 6.7% 100.0% 
2.1.2 Analysis of the Interaction between “Links of 
Crimes” and “Types of Crimes”
According to the Report of Chinese Entrepreneurs’ 
Crimes published by Beijing Normal University in 
2014, financial management and operation process 
are the links involving higher possibilities of private 
entrepreneurs’ crimes, but the report does not reveal 
which crimes tend to be committed in these links. The 
author analyzes the interaction between “types of crimes” 
and “links of crimes”. As shown in Table 4, nearly 70% of 
corruption crimes are committed in enterprises’ financial 
management and operation. Specifically, over half of the 
crimes of misappropriation by virtue of position and the 
crimes of embezzlement are committed in the financial 
management link, and over half of the crimes of offering 
bribes and the crimes of entities’ offering bribes are 
committed in the operation link. 
The interaction analysis of “titles” and “types of 
crimes” show that “top leaders” of private enterprises 
usually commit “output corruption crimes”, while 
department heads usually commit “input corruption 
crimes”. Then, is the link where the “top leaders” of 
privately-owned enterprises commit crimes somewhat 
related to the kink where department heads commit 
crimes? After the interaction analysis of “links where 
crimes are committed” and “titles in enterprises”, the 
Chi-square test results X2=101, df=40, p=0 show that 
entrepreneurs holding different titles in enterprises differ 
significantly in the links where crimes are committed: “Top 
leaders” usually commit crimes in the operation process, 
while department heads generally commit crimes in the 
financial management process. 
2.2 Problem Study
As Professor Zhang Weiying said, entrepreneurs’ pursuit 
of profit is never-ending (Zhang & Sheng, 2014, p.138). 
If we say entrepreneurs’ “input corruption crimes” are 
openly in “pursuit” of wealth, in “output corruption 
crimes”, powers are used as media to intermingle their 
pursuit of powers and their struggle for profits: in pursuit 
of profits for powers, and in pursuit of powers for profits 
(Ibid., p.139). Therefore, in terms of the causes of crimes, 
both “output crimes” committed by “top leaders” and 
“input crimes” committed by department heads are rooted 
in the endless pursuit of interests. But the similarity in 
the causes of crimes does not mean that taking the same 
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Table 3
Interaction Analysis of Specific Crimes and the Links Where Crimes Are Committed (N=268)
Links where crimes are committed
TotalFinancial 
management
Project 
contracting
Change in the 
incorporation 
of the 
company
Operation Change in personnel Financing Production
Purchase of 
materials
Salary 
management
Specific 
crime 
Crime of offering 
bribes 11.1% 5.6% 11.1% 50.0% 11.1% 5.6% 5.6% 100.0% 
Crime of entities’ 
offering bribes 15.4% 76.9% 7.7% 100.0% 
Crime of offering 
bribes to non-
government 
employees 
66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Crime of non-
government 
employees’ 
accepting bribes 
8.5% 3.4% 16.9% 33.9% 11.9% 1.7% 11.9% 10.2% 1.7% 100.0% 
Crime of 
misappropriation 
by virtue of 
position 
4.0% 50.8% 0.8% 27.0% 10.3% 4.8% 2.4% 100.0% 
Crime of 
embezzlement 4.1% 69.4% 2.0% 22.4% 2.0% 100.0% 
Total 6.0% 37.7% 5.6% 0.4% 31.3% 0.7% 1.5% 4.9% 3.7% 0.4% 100.0% 
countermeasures is effective. As can be seen from the 
above data, “top leaders” and “department heads” of 
privately-owned enterprises differ significantly in links 
where crimes are committed and the types of crimes. As 
a result of this difference, different precautions shall be 
taken for these two types of subjects. 
A s  f o r  “ o u t p u t  c o r r u p t i o n  c r i m e s ” ,  o n  t h e 
precondition of sticking to the all-round fight against 
corruption crimes, anti-corruption initiatives will 
demand the standardized management of privately-
owned enterprises, thereby fundamentally reducing 
the “output corruption crimes” committed by private 
entrepreneurs (Zhang, 2014). The reason for taking 
such countermeasures rather than imposing severe 
criminal penalties is that penalties are less deterrent 
for such criminals. U.S. Scholar Simpson believes that 
the difference in the nature of crimes results in the 
difference in the deterrence for criminal penalties. Most 
traditional crimes are generally committed on the basis 
of individuals’ certain needs, and entrepreneurs commit 
crimes mainly for enterprises’ interests. So entrepreneurs 
tend to think that enterprises should bear responsibilities 
for crimes. This difference in conception significantly 
reduces the deterrence of criminal penalties for criminals 
(Simpson, 2002, p.57). Therefore, maybe severe criminal 
penalties are not effective countermeasures for private 
entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes. 
“Input corruption bribes” and “embezzlement 
corruption bribes” should be prevented through the 
improvement of enterprises’ internal risk prevention 
and control mechanism. According to Article 12 of the 
Convention, “Each state shall enhance the accounting 
and audit standards for the private sector, and at its 
discretion specify effective, appropriate and exemplary 
civil, administrative or criminal penalties for the acts 
in violation of the measures”. This provision shows 
that non-standardized financial management leaves 
opportunities for corruption crimes. Currently, China’s 
privately-owned enterprises suffer from low standardized 
operation, poor internal control mechanism, and many 
loopholes in financial management. As a result, they 
are “hotbeds” for “input corruption crimes”. Therefore, 
“input corruption crimes” should be prevented through 
the enhancement of enterprises’ internal control and the 
standardization of enterprise management. In addition, 
according to the social exchange theory, interpersonal 
communication is based on the exchange of materials 
and ideas between each other. Such exchanges aim at 
mutual benefits and derives the sense of obligation. If it 
is found through comparison that exchange inequality 
will result in the feeling of unfairness, cognitive 
imbalance will follow once the sense of obligation and 
the sense of fairness is broken. In order to reestablish 
cognitive balance, unethical acts will be often committed 
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(Donald, 2008). Similarly, when there is an excessively 
large gap between department heads’ contribution to 
enterprises and their returns, they will feel unfair and 
become psychologically imbalanced, and they will re-
strike the balance through the misappropriation of 
enterprises’ assets and the embezzlement of enterprises’ 
fund. Therefore, privately-owned enterprises should 
establish a scientific “return system” so that employees 
can get more pay for more and better work. 
3 .  S E N T E N C I N G  E VA L U AT I O N : 
PENALTIES UNFIT FOR CRIMES ARE 
COMMON
3.1 Description of Status Quo
Private entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes are all economic 
crimes, and the crime amounts range from tens of 
thousands yuan to tens of millions yuan. The wide 
gap between criminal penalties is often denounced. 
But as “voluntary surrender”, “making contributions”, 
“confessing”, “recidivists”, “accessary criminals” and 
other factors affecting sentencing are not rarein crimes, 
it is not scientific to draw the conclusion just through the 
comparison of different crime amounts and prison terms.
Therefore, the author here studies the sentencing based 
on the “mean of declared sentences for crimes without 
statutory sentencing circumstances” commonly used in 
the empirical study in criminology5 and “the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient”6. Owing to the sample 
size, the author only selects the samples in relatively 
larger sizes: the crime of non-government employees’ 
accepting bribes and the crime of misappropriation 
by virtue of position. In addition, according to the 
requirements of the “mean of declared sentences for 
crimes without statutory sentencing circumstances” the 
author selects the samples which meet all of the four 
requirements: “high amount of misappropriation by virtue 
of position”, “declared sentences for crimes without 
statutory sentencing circumstances”, “sentenced to the 
fixed-term imprisonment” and “temporary suspension of 
sentence execution not applicable”; further, the samples 
are classified into two groups according to the provisions 
5 The “mean of declared sentences for crimes without statutory 
sentencing circumstances” refers to the mean of the declared 
sentences in a number of cases without any statutory sentencing 
factors and to a certain statutory sentencing range. Bai, J. J. (2014). 
The practice of empirical legal research (pp.82-86). Beijing: Peking 
University Press. 
6 According to the principles of statistics, the closer the Spearman 
coefficient is to 1, the more balanced the crimes are, that is, The 
better matched between the crime seriousness represented by crimes 
and the penalty severity represented by the term of the fixed-term 
imprisonment; the closer this coefficient is to 0, the less balanced 
the crimes are, the less relevant between the penalty severity and the 
amount of the proceeds from misappropriation by virtue of position. 
of the criminal law: basic constitution (high amounts) 
and aggravating constitution (huge amounts). Among 39 
samples of the crime of misappropriation by virtue of 
position, 10 samples are under the benchmark sentencing 
circumstances and 29 samples are under the aggravating 
sentencing circumstances. Among 27 samples of the 
crime of misappropriation by virtue of position, 9 samples 
are under the benchmark sentencing circumstances 
and 18 samples are under the aggravating sentencing 
circumstances. 
The results of the “mean of declared sentences for 
crimes without statutory sentencing circumstances” 
are as follows: Among the samples of the crime of 
misappropriation by virtue of position, the “mean 
of declared sentences for crimes without statutory 
sentencing circumstances” in 10 cases with huge amounts 
is 24.6 months, and the “mean of declared sentences for 
crimes without statutory sentencing circumstances” in 
29 cases with huge amounts is 81.31 months. It should 
be noted that the median of the statutory fixed-term 
imprisonment in the crime of misappropriation by virtue 
of position with basic composition is 33 months7, and 
the median of the statutory fixed-term imprisonment 
in the crime of misappropriation by virtue of position 
with aggravating composition is 120 months. Among 
the samples of the crime of non-government employees’ 
accepting bribes, the “mean of declared sentences for 
crimes without statutory sentencing circumstances” 
in 9 cases with huge amounts is 22.22 months, and 
the “mean of declared sentences for crimes without 
statutory sentencing circumstances” in 18 cases with 
huge amounts is 68.89 months. It should be noted that 
the median of the statutory fixed-term imprisonment 
in the crime of non-government employees’ accepting 
bribes with basic composition is 33 months, and the 
median of the statutory fixed-term imprisonment in the 
crime of non-government employees’ accepting bribes 
with aggravating composition is 120 months. Thus 
it can be seen that in the samples of the two crimes, 
the “mean of declared sentences for crimes without 
statutory sentencing circumstances” is lower than 
the corresponding median of the statutory fixed-term 
imprisonment no matter whether the crimes are of the 
basic composition or of the aggravating composition. 
In the test on the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, 
the selected samples are consistent with the samples 
of the “mean of declared sentences for crimes without 
statutory sentencing circumstances”, and the selected 
7 The median of a certain statutory sentencing range is calculated 
as follows: The upper limit minus the lower limit, then divided 
by 2, and then plus the lower limit. Take the statutory sentencing 
range in the crime of misappropriation by virtue of position with 
basic composition as example, the upper limit of the fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than 5 years is 60 months, and the lower 
limit is 6 months, So 60-6=54; 54÷ 2=27; 27+6=33. The same 
below. 
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two indicators are “proceeds of crime” and “term of 
fixed-term imprisonment”. As shown by the results, 
among the 10 crimes without any statutory sentencing 
factors, with high amounts of misappropriation by 
virtue of position, with the fixed-term imprisonment 
not applicable and with the temporary suspension of 
sentence execution not applicable, the rank correlation 
coeff icient  between penalt ies  is  0.598,  and the 
significance value of this result, namely, the p value 
is 0.068 (as shown in Table 4). On one hand, this 
shows that the amounts of misappropriation by virtue 
of position have a significant effect on the penalty 
severity, the two are highly positively correlated, and 
the higher the amounts of misappropriation by virtue 
of position, the longer the imprisonment terms. On 
the other hand, there is a large gap between 0.598 
and 1, so the balance between crimes and penalties 
should be further improved. Similarly, according to 
the calculation of the 29 samples with huge amounts, 
the correlation coefficient is 0.133 and p value is 0.49, 
showing that when the amounts of misappropriation 
by virtue of position are huge, the amounts of the 
proceeds of crime do not significantly affect the 
penalty severity, and crimes and penalties are much 
less balanced. Among the samples of the crime of non-
government employees’ accepting bribes, the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient of the group with basic 
composition is 0.832 and p value is 0.005, which 
shows that in the crime of non-government employees’ 
accepting bribes with basic composition, the amounts 
of the proceeds of crime significantly affect the penalty 
severity; in the group with aggravating composition, 
the correlation coefficient is 0.227 and p value is 0.365, 
which shows that the amounts of the proceeds of crime 
do not significantly affect the penalty severity, and 
crimes and penalties are much less balanced. 
Table 4
Test on the Correlation Between the Proceeds of Crime and the Specific Imprisonment Term
Imprisonment term of a specific crime (months) Proceeds of crime 
Imprisonment term of a specific 
crime (months) 
Pearson correlation 1 .598 
Significance (two-sided) .068 
N 10 10 
Proceeds of crime 
Pearson correlation .598 1 
Significance (two-sided) .068 
N 10 10 
3.2 Problem Study
With regard to the relationship between the “mean 
of declared sentences for crimes without statutory 
sentencing circumstances” and the median of statutory 
sentences, some scholars studied the “means of declared 
sentences for crimes without statutory sentencing 
circumstances” of larceny, the crime of intentional injury, 
the crime of traffic offences and the crime of robbery, 
and they drew the conclusion that “the means of declared 
sentences for crimes without statutory sentencing 
circumstances are generally lower than the median of 
statutory sentences” (Bai, 2014, p.85). In this study, 
this conclusion is verified by the “means of declared 
sentences for crimes without statutory sentencing 
circumstances” in the crime of private entrepreneurs’ 
misappropriation by virtue of position and the crime of 
non-government employees’ accepting bribes, which 
to some extent shows that the penalties for private 
entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes are homogeneous to 
the penalties for other crimes. But such homogeneity 
is inadequate to prove that crimes and penalties are 
balanced. As shown by the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient, under the basic composition circumstances in 
the crime of misappropriation by virtue of crime and the 
crime of non-government employees’ accepting bribes, 
crimes and penalties are highly balanced; but under the 
aggravating composition circumstances, crimes and 
penalties are much less balanced, showing that judicial 
authorities have more discretion in the sentencing in the 
cases involving huge amounts. 
In fact, an important reason for the long-standing 
questioning of China’s judicial fairness is the lack 
of standardization in sentencing.In order to address 
this problem, the Supreme People’s Court and other 
authorities promulgated the Guiding Opinions on 
the Sentencing by the People’s  Court  (for  t r ial 
implementa t ion) ,  the  Opin ions  on  the  Severa l 
Issues concerning the Standardization of Sentencing 
Procedures (for trial implementation), the Notice 
on  the  Implementa t ion  of  the  S tandard iza t ion 
of Sentencing, and the Guiding Opinions on the 
Sentencing for Common Crimes. On January 1, 2014, 
the courts across China began to officially implement 
the standardization of sentencing. But this study shows 
that currently, “arbitrary” sentencing still exists, and 
the reason is the inadequate elaboration of the existing 
Guiding Opinions on the Sentencing by the People’s 
Court. 
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According to the report of the Eighteenth National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, “efforts 
should be made to promote scientific legislation, strict law 
enforcement, judicial fairness and law-abiding by all the 
people”. Therefore, balance between crimes and penalties 
is an essential part of judicial fairness. Therefore, 
in this context, the range of sentencing for private 
entrepreneurs’ corruption crimes should be further 
elaborated through the reference to the legal instruments 
published online and the guiding cases published 
from time to time by judicial authorities, based on the 
proportions of the sentencing circumstances in specific 
sentencing specified in the Guiding Opinions on the 
Sentencing by the People’s Court, and in combination 
with the amount criteria for crimes set forth in the 
criminal law. In the comprehensive deepening of reform 
and the fight against corruption through the rule by law, 
this is not only an inevitable requirement but also an 
inherent part of judicial fairness. 
CONCLUSION 
To sum up, importance should be attached to the 
countermeasures against  pr ivate entrepreneurs’ 
corruption crimes because of the harms of such crimes. 
Owing to the significant difference of enterprises’ “top 
leaders” and “department heads” in the types of crimes, 
different countermeasures should be taken based on the 
types of crimes. Criminal penalty is an important link 
in crime prevention, but the imbalance between crimes 
and penalties will not only undermine the effect of the 
enforcement of penalties, but also seriously damage 
judicial fairness. Therefore, suitable countermeasures 
should be taken to standardize sentencing. 
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